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Organizations are all around us: not just firms, 
hospitals, schools, and government agencies, but 
also communities, unions, social movements, 
and more.1
Culture is trickier to define, as well as to 
analyze. As Raymond Williams (1983, p. 87) 
remarked, “culture is one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English lan-
guage.” In addition, a “historical overview of 
the shifting meanings of the word … estimated 
that there were more than 160 definitions in use” (Steinmetz 1999, p. 5).
For decades, economics largely ignored 
culture, but things are starting to change.2 
1 Gibbons and Roberts (forthcoming) sketch historical, 
contemporary, and prospective economic analyses of such 
organizations. In fact, construing an organization to be some-
thing that can be organized, they also include as “organiza-
tions” governance structures such as some  hand-in-glove 
supply relationships, joint ventures, and alliances between 
firms, as well as some regulatory relationships and 
 public-private partnerships between a government and a firm. 
2 DiMaggio (1994, p. 29) computed that in ECONLIT the 
keyword “culture” appeared in 0.17 percent of references 
during 1981–1987 and 0.38 percent during 1988–1992. We
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For example, some economists have begun to 
assess the effect of culture on economic activ-
ities. Much of this work has used conceptions 
of culture such as the “customary beliefs and 
values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation.”3
We focus on organizational culture, which 
Schein (1985, p. 9) defines as:
a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group 
as it learns to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and internal inte-
gration—that has worked well enough to 
be considered … the correct way to per-
ceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems.
We see organizational culture as partly a 
result of economic activity, not just a determi-
nant of it. In particular, we are interested in both 
the effect of management on organizational cul-
ture and the effect of organizational culture on 
performance.
To put our focus on organizational culture 
and performance in context, we briefly review 
neighboring research. First, there is a growing 
literature on how large-scale and slow-moving 
aspects of culture can affect correspondingly 
large-scale and slow-moving economic activi-
ties, such as patterns of international trade or the 
determinants of and behaviors within political 
and legal institutions.4
Second, turning to economic activity inside 
organizations, there is much research (largely 
outside economics) on whether a preexisting, 
external culture may seep into an  organization 
computed that these figures are 1.12 percent for 1993–2000 
and 1.83 percent for 2001–2013. 
3 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006, p. 23). 
4 For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and 
Tabellini (2010). 
MAY 2015332 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
from outside. Hofstede (1980) is a classic 
 example, analyzing differences in IBM’s 39 
international marketing and service departments 
in terms of four dimensions of national cultures.5
We complement this second research stream 
by asking whether organizational culture can 
be developed and managed internally, in addi-
tion to national culture seeping in from outside. 
In short, here and in related work, we explore 
the opening paragraph of Schein’s (1985, p. ix) 
seminal work on culture and leadership:
The purpose of this book is, first of all, 
to clarify the concept of “organizational 
culture” and, second, to show how the 
problems of organizational leadership 
and organizational culture are basically 
intertwined. I hope to demonstrate that 
organizational culture helps to explain 
many organizational phenomena, that 
culture can aid or hinder organizational 
effectiveness, and that leadership is the 
fundamental process by which organiza-
tional cultures are formed and changed.
In the remainder of this essay we proceed 
in two steps. First, we describe an interven-
tion that dramatically improved organizational 
performance. This intervention conspicuously 
included a culture-change component, so we use 
it to illustrate empirical analyses that could be 
conducted in similar settings. Second, assum-
ing persuasive evidence on the effect of orga-
nizational culture on performance, we discuss 
related theoretical issues.
I. Organizational Culture and Performance in 
Health Care (and Beyond)
In this section we describe (i) the setting, 
method, and outcomes of an intervention that 
worked and (ii) ways one might analyze the 
association between organizational culture and 
performance in these and similar data.
5 Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) are a recent 
example from economics, finding that, in a sample of multi-
nationals, a plant in a different country than the headquarters 
enjoys greater decentralization (e.g., the plant manager has 
a larger discretionary spending limit) when the trust score 
between the headquarters country and the plant country is 
higher. 
A. An Intervention that Worked 6
Until recently, central line-associated 
blood stream infections (CLABSIs) were an 
 all-too-common event in intensive care units (ICUs). In the late 1990s, a team at Johns 
Hopkins developed an intervention that essen-
tially eliminated CLABSIs in a surgical ICU. In 
the early 2000s, the intervention was tested in 
over 100 ICUs in Michigan, where it reduced 
median quarterly CLABSI rates (per 1,000 cath-
eter days) from 2.7 at baseline to 0. Recently, 
in a nationwide collaborative involving more 
than 1,800 hospital units, CLABSI rates fell by 
41 percent, and the intervention saved an esti-
mated 290–605 lives and $36– 40 million in 
averted costs.
For purposes of illustrating organizational 
issues, we focus on just two components of the 
intervention: (i) a checklist consisting of five 
 evidence-based practices to reduce CLABSIs (e.g., washing hands, draping the patient, clean-
ing the skin with an appropriate antiseptic) 
and (ii) a Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety 
Program (CUSP) designed to improve safety 
culture in the ICU. CUSP included several steps: 
assessing culture, educating staff on the science 
of safety, using staff to identify local safety con-
cerns, partnering with senior executives to mobi-
lize resources and demonstrate commitment, 
learning from defects, implementing teamwork 
tools for improvement, and reassessing culture.
While the checklist was widely discussed and 
celebrated, the “mistake of the ‘simple checklist’ 
story is in the assumption that a technical solu-
tion (checklists) can solve an adaptive (socio-
cultural) problem.” Instead, the “checklists were 
… just one component of a more comprehen-
sive programme to alter the culture of the ICUs, 
which included, among other things, empower-
ing nurses to stop procedures if guidelines were 
not followed.” (Bosk et al. 2009, pp. 444– 445)
Such empowerment required a fundamental 
change in organizational culture. As Pronovost 
and Vohr (2010, p. 49) report: “nobody debated 
the evidence, nobody challenged the items on 
the checklist, and nobody questioned whether 
we should do them. But everyone objected to the 
change in culture.”
6 See Berenholtz et al. (2004), Pronovost et al. (2006), 
and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2013).
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B. Potential Empirical Analyses
Previous studies have found a cross-sectional 
relationship between organizational culture 
and outcomes.7 Of course, such studies cannot 
control for fixed, unmeasured organizational 
attributes that might be correlated with both cul-
ture and outcomes.
ICUs in the Michigan project collected 
monthly data on CLABSIs, and they adminis-
tered the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) 
at the beginning and end of the intervention. The 
SAQ assesses agreement with 65 statements 
such as “I am frequently unable to express dis-
agreement with staff physicians/intensivists in 
this ICU” (Item 41) and “Hospital administra-
tion supports my daily efforts” (Item 10).8
Data like those from Michigan allow a 
fixed-effects analysis of the following model:
(1)   Y it =  θ i +  κ t + β ×  c it +  X it × δ ,
where  Y it is an organizational outcome,  θ i and  κ t 
are organization and year dummies,  c it is a mea-
sure of organizational culture, and  X it is a vec-
tor of covariates. In the Michigan setting, such a 
regression asks: within an ICU, is the change in 
a measure derived from the SAQ associated with 
the change in CLABSIs?
Slightly enriching this basic analysis, one 
might study whether changes in multiple mea-
sures from the SAQ are simultaneously associ-
ated with changes in CLABSIs. That is, is there 
a single, underlying notion of organizational 
culture, with different measures offering differ-
ent approximations to this underlying notion, or 
are there multiple dimensions of culture, each 
with an independent effect on outcomes?
Another approach would allow interactions, 
not just main effects. For example, there may 
be heterogeneous treatment effects, and these 
might relate to initial conditions such as scores 
on SAQ measures.
Finally, culture does not determine produc-
tivity—actions do. Adding controls for the right 
actions should thus reduce or even eliminate 
any measured effect of culture on outcomes. 
For example, in the Michigan project, suppose 




data were also collected on compliance with 
the checklist. It would be interesting to know 
whether changes in culture or in compliance 
are more closely associated with change in 
outcomes.
II. Avenues for Theoretical Work?
Of course, persuasive evidence about the 
effect of organizational culture on performance 
would raise further questions. For example, (i) 
can organizational culture be changed, (ii) can 
it be copied, and (iii) why don’t lagging orga-
nizations copy the cultures of successful 
competitors?
Recent economic models of these issues 
relate to the psychological contract between an 
individual and an organization—an idea first 
described in Schein’s (1965, p. 11) inaugural 
text on organizational psychology:
… the individual has a variety of expec-
tations of the organization and … the 
organization has a variety of expectations 
of him. … Expectations such as these are 
not written into any formal agreement 
between employee and organization, yet 
they operate powerfully as determinants 
of behavior.
In perhaps the first discussion of such issues 
within economics, Leibenstein (1982) suggested 
that productivity within a firm might be deter-
mined by the “effort convention” that the firm 
and its workers adopt. Kreps (1990, 1996) then 
provided (i) more explicit connection to organi-
zational culture, (ii) illustrative repeated-game 
models, and (iii) descriptions of holes in the 
theory that needed to be filled. More recently, 
Gibbons and Henderson (2013) interpreted sev-
eral concrete management practices as relying 
on such “relational contracts” and summarized 
the theoretical literature to date.9
Gibbons and Henderson emphasized that rela-
tional contracts often face not only  credibility 
problems (should you believe the promise being 
made?) but also clarity problems (do you under-
stand the promise being made?). As an example 
9 Informally, a relational contract is a shared understand-
ing of the parties’ roles in and rewards from collaboration—
an understanding so rooted in the details of the parties’ 
relationship that it cannot be enforced by a court. 
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of the clarity problem, ask yourself (depending 
on your seniority) either (i) can you articulate 
your department’s tenure policy or (ii) would 
you understand it if someone articulated it to 
you?
This distinction between credibility and clar-
ity relates to DiMaggio’s (1994, pp. 27–28) 
discussion of the “regulative” versus the “con-
stitutive” aspects of culture. The regulative 
aspects include norms, values, and conventions 
that reshape an individual’s pursuit of self-in-
terest—aspects that might be modeled, at least 
in reduced form, as shaping an individual’s 
payoff  U i (a, s) received when action a is taken 
in state s. In contrast, the constitutive aspects 
include taken-for-granted cognitive categories 
and schema necessary for parties to think and 
interact—aspects that might be modeled as 
shaping an individual’s perception of the state 
s or understanding of the intended action in that 
state a(s).10
The Michigan project as a whole (and some 
of the SAQ items in particular) allow this kind of 
theorizing to be cast in fairly concrete terms. For 
example, improvement in Item 41 from the SAQ (“I am frequently unable to express disagreement 
with staff physicians/intensivists in this ICU”) 
could relate to both regulative and constitutive 
aspects of culture—regulative by changing the 
value of an action (expressing disagreement) 
and constitutive by helping nurses and doctors 
reach shared understanding of a state (a scenario 
when such expression is valuable).11
In fact, Item 41 seems almost concrete 
enough to guide managerial action. How leaders 
act to change organizational culture (and how 
economists model this) may depend on whether 
they focus on the regulative or the constitutive 
aspects. We believe that important theoretical 
contributions may arise from taking the clarity 
problem and the constitutive aspects of culture 
seriously. Combined with the empirical agenda 
sketched above, we see important work for 
economists to do on organizational culture and 
performance.
10 See DiMaggio (1997) for a path-breaking review of 
further possible roles for cognitive psychology in the study 
of culture. 
11 Item 41 also evokes the concept of “psychological 
safety”—roughly, a “shared belief … that the team is safe 
for interpersonal risk-taking.” See Edmondson and Lei 
(2014) for a survey. 
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